Hong Kong, February 25 (ANI): Alarm rippled through Australian and New Zealand corridors of power as a Chinese naval task group sailed through waters separating the antipodean nations, firing live rounds and causing commercial jetliners to divert. Simultaneously, China signed an unexpected deal with the Cook Islands to expand its maritime foothold in the South-Pacific.

Three vessels from the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) - the Type 055 cruiser Zunyi, Type 054A frigate Hengyang and Type 903 replenishment ship Weishanhu - sailed deep into the Tasman Sea, the body of water separating Australia and New Zealand. After penetrating so deeply into the maritime region, this was the first time Chinese military live-firing had caused jetliners there to change their flightpaths.

Many believe that such Chinese naval projection is both promoting its strategic interests and putting Australia and New Zealand in their place within a future Chinese-led 'community of common destiny'.

After arriving in the Coral Sea on 13 February, the PLAN ship trio sailed south, passing well east of Sydney, before traveling as far as northeast of Tasmania. Whilst on the high seas, the ships broadcast a warning on international radio frequencies on 21 February telling aircraft to stay away from an area 640km from Sydney since they were firing their weapons. A second live-fire exercise closer to New Zealand occurred the following day. At time of writing, the Chinese ships were holding position 520km east of Tasmania.

New Zealand Defence Minister Judith Collins said the New Zealand government was not 'worried', but was 'very aware' of the PLAN activities. Ships and aircraft from the ANZAC allies were closely monitoring the situation. She added, 'Nobody wants to overreact, no one wants to get too excitable, everybody wants to stay very calm and understand that, while China is complying with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is always quite good to give people notice.'

Indeed, Collins' major complaint was China's failure to give sufficient notification of its activities: 'They have not deigned to advise us on what they are doing in the middle of the Tasman Sea,' she said.

China hit back at Canberra's and Wellington's comments, saying Australia had 'deliberately hyped' the PLA's activities. Wu Qian, a spokesman for China's National Ministry of Defense, said, 'During the period, China organized live-fire training of naval guns toward the sea on the basis of repeatedly issuing prior safety notices,' and that its actions were 'in full compliance with international law and international practices, with no impact on aviation flight safety'.

Jennifer Parker, an Expert Associate at the National Security College, Australian National University, agreed that 'live-firing exercises on the high seas are standard training practices permitted under international law. Australia does this on our deployments, and we should avoid overreacting. It's not aggressive; it's just what warships do on the high seas.'

Parker also highlighted that 'there's no legal obligation for foreign warships to notify coastal nations over 300 nautical miles away about live-firing activities on the high seas'.

Without a notice to airmen (NOTAM) being formally issued, Parker nonetheless pointed out, 'Although the details remain unclear, indications from flight diversions suggest that the Chinese warships may have been too close to civilian air transit routes. If this is the case, it represents poor practice that warrants diplomatic discussion.'

Beijing said it was 'astonished and strongly dissatisfied' with Australasia's reaction.

However, Australian and Kiwi responses were muted and in sharp contrast with how the PLA reacts to foreign naval transits through the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait. On such occasions, China can pester ships and aircraft with dangerous maneuvers, laser dazzling, aggressively broadcasting warnings, and sharp complaints from government ministries.

For instance, a Chinese fighter jet deployed flares in the flightpath of an Australian P-8A on 11 February, because it asserted that the maritime patrol aircraft 'deliberately intruded into the airspace around China's Xisha [Paracel] Islands'. Ironically, China described its dangerous antics, which dramatically hyped up tensions, as 'legitimate, legal, professional and restrained'.

In its reaction to the PLAN task group in the Tasman Sea, Wu hypocritically said Australia, which was far more restrained than China as described above, should have 'an objective and rational attitude, show more sincerity and professionalism, and make genuine efforts to contribute to the stable development of these ties'.

Parker, a former Australian naval officer, advised, 'China's rare deployment to our region - without stopping in Australia or New Zealand and far removed from major maritime routes - appears to be a deliberate display of its capability to deploy and sustain operations here.'

She recommended: 'While China's maneuver underscores its blue-water capabilities, Australia should focus on addressing its naval capability gaps rather than overreacting to this event. An overreaction hands China an unnecessary propaganda win next time Australia conducts live firings on the high seas while deployed, and may constrain ourown training opportunities in the future.'

Mick Ryan, a former major general in the Australian Army, argued that Chinese actions need to be seen through a strategic lens rather than just legal obligations to provide notifications. Discussing Beijing's rationale for these drills, he said, 'The most obvious reason is to point out that, if Australia conducts freedom of navigation exercises off the Chinese coast, China can reciprocate. But unlike China, Australia doesn't have a nine-dot line beyond the 12-nautical-mile limit where it seeks to deny international maritime traffic.'

Ryan also remarked on China: 'They've conducted other deployments into waters adjacent to Australia, which governments have kept quiet about previously. However, like they have around Taiwan, the Chinese will probably now normalize these kinds of deployments around Australia. They'll want to force us to keep our ships closer to home for political as well as military reasons, which means we can't help out our allies farther north. There's also no doubt that the Chinese will be collecting intelligence on the Australian response. This will extend to the sensors used, platforms deployed, Oz [Australian] warship readiness and tactics employed.'

Beyond that, Ryan said, 'At a higher level, the Chinese will be measuring the political response by the Australian government. So far, the Oz government has been supine, and is yet to realize that this - like the events in Europe last week - is a very significant shift in the security environment. Old playbooks no longer apply. The Chinese will, perhaps more importantly, be measuring the US response. Will the US do or say something about this deliberately aggressive act against a treaty ally? This is perhaps the primary driver of the PLA aggression. Do the principles on display by the US administration in Europe last week also apply in Asia?'

Ryan also opined, 'Of course, it's possible that China may have miscalculated here. They're the masters of childish overreaction, after all. Might this wildly irresponsible and unnecessary aggression actually prompt a more robust debate on defense in Oz and NZ, or even a much needed increasing in spending?'

Indeed, the former general concluded, 'This Chinese operation fundamentally changes our security outlook. We're dealing with an aggressive, irresponsible PLA that so far we have shown little capacity or willingness to deter. Now, with them live-firing off Australia's coast, might this be the shock our politicians need to fund the ready, lethal and large Australian Defence Force we need to counter 21st-century authoritarianism?'

China is being provocative. As Michael Shoebridge, Director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, tweeted, 'China's PLA Navy has no reason to do live firing in waters between Australia and NZ except as a provocative act. Beijing knew this would cause urgent diversions of civilian aircraft. They wanted that to happen. This isn't about freedom of navigation.'

Shoebridge added, '...The presence, armaments and PLA choices underscore that Australia's location by itself no longer protects our homeland or population. That's worth reacting to.' Indeed, Australia can no longer rely on geographical isolation to protect key population centers and infrastructure from direct military threat.

Homeland defense issues needs to be addressed by both Canberra and Wellington.

Turning to the Cook Islands, situated approximately 3,200km northeast of New Zealand, the territory signed a controversial memorandum of understanding with China on 14 February. Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown was in Harbin to sign the Deepening Blue Economy Cooperation agreement that covers investment and cooperation in port wharves, shipbuilding and ship repair, ocean transportation and deep-sea fishing bases.

Doubtlessly, this agreement strengthens China's maritime presence deep in the South Pacific. Infrastructure development and access aids China's massive fishing fleet, which regularly performs illegal fishing. In the future it may also support China Coast Guard activity, as China's law enforcement agency roams farther afield. This is dangerous, as Chairman Xi Jinping's renegade coast guard is guilty of multiple violations of international regulations, and is more concerned about claiming territory illegally than it is in encouraging safety at sea.

The Cook Islands, comprising just 15,000 inhabitants, is in free association with NewZealand. As a realm of its larger neighbor, its constitutional agreement is to consult with Wellington on anything that impacts its security or defense. However, it failed to do so on this occasion when it signed the agreement with Beijing.

The Sino-Cook Island agreement, with a five-year lifespan, falls under China's wide-ranging Global Development Initiative and contributes to China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition to the aforementioned maritime access, Article 3 listed 'exploration and development of deep-sea mineral resources'. Nonetheless, the Cook Islands said it had not granted any exploration or mining licenses to Beijing.

The Pacific territory's shock move has caused tensions with New Zealand, which accused it of 'not properly consulting'. This year marks the Cook Islands' 60th anniversary of free association, and New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters said, 'While the connection between the people of the Cook Islands and New Zealand remains resolutely strong, we currently face challenges in the government-to-government relationship.'

China will be delighted with this outcome. Not only has it signed an important agreement giving greater access to the South Pacific, but it has thrown a spanner in the works between a Five Eyes member and a vulnerable Pacific nation.

Both these events - the presence of a PLAN task group in the Tasman Sea, and the signing of an agreement granting China maritime access to the Cook Islands - are concerning.

Sam Roggeveen, Director of the Australian-based Lowy Institute think-tank's International Security Program, acknowledged that, as China's navy grows, it will inevitably increase its activities near Australia.

Yet Roggeveen pointed out, 'China needs to know that, while it is free to operate in those waters, it does so in the knowledge that, in the worst case, Australia can overcome whatever Beijing sends our way. That means building an Australian Defence Force focused tightly on the job of sinking ships and shooting down aircraft that threaten our landmass.'

The three Chinese warships were a long way from home - more than 7,000km from their South Sea Fleet headquarters in Zhanjiang, southern China. Roggeveen warned that 'it is imperative for Australia to maintain its advantage by ensuring that China can never build military bases closer to Australia. In that regard, Australian policy has been rather successful lately, starting with the Pacific Step-Up under the previous government and continuing in more recent times with defense agreements with Nauru, Tuvalu and Papua New Guinea .'

However, China has already gained a security foothold in Solomon Islands, has tremendous influence in Vanuatu, and now has carved out access in the Cook Islands.

Roggeveen said Australia needs a quietly implacable policy approach towards China, where it neither escalates nor backs down against Chinese coercion. 'Provocations such as China's weapons drills are the moments when stoicism is tested, when the temptation is to lash out because it fulfils a psychological need to feel like you're doing something, and the political pressure to look like you're doing something. But the right response is to continue the quiet work of making Australia into an echidna [aspiny anteater native to Australia]: unthreatening to those who mean the nation no harm, but prickly and indigestible to those who do.' (ANI)